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2016 IIP Argentina Research Paper 
When Argentina’s new president, Mauricio Macri, took office in December 2015, he 
faced high inflation, economic stagnation, fiscal deficit, depressed foreign trade, downward 
pressure on the value of the currency and a long-running debt dispute with vulture funds. In 
1989, when President Carlos Menem came into power, he faced a similar economic situation. 
President Menem followed the Washington Consensus’ neoliberal approach to address the 
problems in the 1990s, but his policies eventually led the country to the 1998–2002 Argentine 
Great Depression. Many worry that President Macri may repeat what happened in the 1990s 
and lead Argentina to another crisis. This paper tries to analyze the reasons for the 1998–2002 
Argentine Great Depression and the likelihood that President Macri will repeat the tragedy.     
Economic Situation in 1989 
President Menem was elected in 1989 to succeed President Raul Alfonsin. At the time, 
Argentina’s economic situation was full of doom and gloom. “Following more than a decade of 
high inflation and economic stagnation, and after several failed attempts to stabilize the 
economy, in late 1989 Argentina had fallen into hyperinflation and a virtual economic 
collapse.”1  
The data was shocking: “In 1989, only 30,000 out of 30 million Argentines paid any 
income taxes. That year, inflation reached an unprecedented 5,000 percent, rising so fast that 
some supermarkets read prices out over intercoms rather than bothering to update price 
                                                          
1 Independent Evaluation Office, IMF, The IMF and Argentina, 1991–2001 (2004), at 11.  
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tags.”2 The crisis interrupted the normal running of the society and it fell into chaos. Strikes 
swept the country and rioters looted supermarkets for their survivals. President Alfonsin 
decided to hand over power five months early to Menem. 
Foreign trade was also severely impacted: “the ability of Latin America's third-largest 
economy to maintain its imports has been clouded in recent days by the sharpening foreign 
exchange shortage and by growing skepticism among foreign creditors.”3 In June, “an attorney 
charged by Mr. Menem with auditing the national treasury, estimated that Argentina's hard 
currency reserves are $200 million, enough to cover two weeks of imports.”4 
Menem’s Economic Policies 
 The economic, political and social crises forced President Menem to immediately take a 
reformist course. His approach was to follow the Washington Consensus, which is a list of ten 
policies coined in 1989 by English economist John Williamson “for a conference that the 
Institute for International Economics convened in order to examine the extent to which the old 
ideas of development economics that had governed Latin American economic policy since the 
1950s were being swept aside by the set of ideas that had long been accepted as appropriate 
within the OECD.”5 The ten policies include fiscal discipline, a competitive exchange rate, trade 
liberalization, liberalization of inward foreign direct investment, and privatization.6 
                                                          
2 Chronology: Argentina's turbulent history of economic crises, Reuters, Jul. 30, 2014, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-argentina-debt-chronology-idUSKBN0FZ23N20140730. 
3 James Brooke, INTERNATIONAL REPORT; Inflation Ruining Argentine Economy, N.Y. Times, Jun. 12, 1989, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/12/business/international-report-inflation-ruining-argentine-economy.html. 
4 Id. 
5 John Williamson, A Short History of the Washington Consensus, Institute for International Economics, Sep. 24, 
2004, http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/williamson0904-2.pdf. 
6 Id. 
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“Menem spent the 1990s cultivating foreign investment, slashing import tariffs, and 
privatizing money-losing state enterprises.”7 In 1991, the Menem regime passed the 
Convertibility Law to peg the Argentine currency to the U.S. dollar. The new exchange rate 
regime was designed to tackle inflation once and for all, and stabilize the economy. It 
establishing a hard nominal peg with U.S. dollar’s stable value, forcibly giving peso the same 
value. market-oriented structural reforms to promote efficiency and productivity in the 
economy. Moreover, as part of the Convertibility Plan, “various service sectors were 
deregulated, trade was liberalized, and anticompetitive price-fixing schemes were removed; 
privatization proceeded vigorously, notably in oil, power, and telecommunications, yielding 
large capital revenues.”8 
 The Convertibility Plan immediately served its original purpose, and was a success for 
the early years. “Inflation, which was raging at a monthly rate of 27 percent in February 1991, 
declined to 2.8 percent in May 1991; on an annual basis, inflation fell to single digits in the 
summer of 1993 and remained low (or even negative) from 1994 to the end of the convertibility 
regime in early 2002.”9 
 After the most urgent problem of inflation was solved, the fiscal austerity and economic 
liberalization did their jobs to improve the economy. “The overall fiscal balance of the federal 
government improved significantly from the previous years, with an average budgeted deficit of 
less than 1 percent of GDP during 1991–98. Growth performance was impressive through early 
1998, except for a brief setback in 1995 when Argentina was adversely affected by the Mexican 
                                                          
7 Chronology: Argentina's turbulent history of economic crises, supra note 2. 
8 Independent Evaluation Office, supra note 1, at 11. 
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4 
 
crisis. For 1991–98, GDP growth averaged nearly 6 percent a year, vindicating the market-
oriented reforms introduced in the early 1990s. Attracted by a more investment-friendly 
climate, there were large capital inflows in the form of portfolio and direct investments. During 
1992–99, Argentina received more than $100 billion in net capital inflows, including over $60 
billion in gross foreign direct investments.”10 
 “In October 1998, the performance of Argentina received the attention of the world 
when President Carlos Menem shared the podium of the Annual Meetings with the IMF 
Managing Director, who characterized ‘the experience of Argentina in recent years’ as 
‘exemplary.’ The Managing Director further remarked: ‘Argentina has a story to tell the world: a 
story which is about the importance of fiscal discipline, of structural change, and of monetary 
policy rigorously maintained.’”11 
The Crisis12 
 The 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression started with a combination of adverse 
external shocks, including a reversal in capital flows to emerging markets following the Russian 
default in August 1998; weakening of demand in major trading partners, notably in Brazil; a fall 
in oil and other commodity prices; general strengthening of the U.S. dollar against the euro; 
and the 70 percent devaluation of the Brazilian real against the U.S. dollar in early 1999.  
Argentina’s performance deteriorated from the second half of 1998. Real GDP fell by 
over 3% in the second half of 1998. There was a mild pickup in economic activity in the second 
half of 1999, spurred by increased government spending in the run-up to the October 
                                                          
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 12. 
12 The facts in this section are from Independent Evaluation Office, supra, at 12-13. 
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presidential elections, but this was not sustained and GDP declined by 3.5% for 1999 as a 
whole. The economy never recovered through the depression. 
The economic slowdown, coupled with the election-driven surge in public spending in 
1999, hit Argentina’s fiscal solvency hard. The country’s consolidated fiscal balance had been in 
deficit throughout the 1990s except in 1993, but the magnitude was not large. The situation 
changed in 1999, when growth decelerated and the public finances deteriorated sharply. The 
debt-to-GDP ratio rose from 37.7% of GDP at end-1997 to 47.6% at end-1999, an increase of 
10% points in just two years. The ratio would eventually reach 62% at the end of 2001. 
Argentina’s problems intensified in 2000, and the convertibility regime prevented the 
government from making effective reactions. In 2000, growing solvency concerns over the 
cumulative increase in public debt were exacerbated by the continued appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar and a further drying up of capital flows to emerging market economies. These 
developments would normally require a smaller current account deficit and a depreciation of 
the real exchange rate, but the convertibility regime placed severe limitations on the ability of 
Argentina to achieve this adjustment in a manner that could avoid recession.  
 From the spring of 2001, the authorities took a series of measures in quick succession, 
including: an announced plan to change the anchor of the convertibility regime from the U.S. 
dollar to an equally weighted basket of the dollar and the euro (the switch to take effect only 
when the two currencies reached parity); a series of heterodox industrial or protectionist 
policies (called “competitiveness plans”), involving various tax-exemption measures in sectors 
most adversely affected by the recession; and an exchange of outstanding government bonds 
totaling $30 billion in face value for longer maturity instruments (the so-called mega-swap). 
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However, many of these measures were perceived by the markets as desperate or impractical, 
and served to damage market confidence. 
Despite these initiatives and the financial support of the IMF, market access could not 
be restored, and spreads on Argentine bonds rose sharply in the third quarter of 2001. Amid 
intensified capital flight and deposit runs, capital controls and a partial deposit freeze were 
introduced in December 2001. With Argentina failing to comply with the fiscal targets, the IMF 
indicated that it could not clear the disbursement scheduled for December. At the end of 
December, following the resignation of President Fernando De La Rua, the country partially 
defaulted on its international obligations. In early January 2002, Argentina formally abandoned 
the convertibility regime and replaced it with a dual exchange rate system. 
Factors Contributing to the Crisis 
 Given the time length and complexity of the development of the 1998–2002 Argentine 
Great Depression, many factors, domestic and external, are pointed to for contributing to the 
crisis. IMF summarized the following three factors as critically important: (i) weak fiscal policy 
(Mussa, 2002); (ii) the rigid exchange rate regime (Gonzales Fraga, 2002); and (iii) adverse 
external shocks (Calvo and others, 2002).13 
 IMF divides all factors into two classes: one that generated vulnerability and the 
immediate factors that triggered the crisis.14 “In the absence of triggering events, a crisis may 
not have occurred when it did, but the underlying vulnerability would have continued and a 
crisis could have been triggered later by other adverse shocks. In the absence of the underlying 
                                                          
13 Id. at 14. 
14 Id.  
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vulnerability, however, the same adverse developments would not have had the catastrophic 
effects that were associated with the crisis, though they may well have produced some 
negative effects.”15 
 Weak fiscal policy is one of the major reasons for Argentina’s underlying vulnerability. 
“The weak fiscal policy created serious liquidity problems for the government when market 
conditions tightened and led to the eruption of a funding crisis in early 2001. If Argentina’s 
public sector had generated surpluses in its fiscal account during the precrisis years, it could 
have avoided the tightening liquidity constraints in 2000 and the all-out funding crisis of the 
public sector in 2001. Argentina also would have enjoyed greater flexibility in using fiscal policy 
to cope with the impact of adverse shocks, and would have been spared from the need to 
contract fiscal policy when output was already declining.”16 The Menem government had used 
up all the money in its treasury, depriving itself of the necessary fiscal ammunition to fight the 
external shocks. It was also in serious debt, so it could not borrow to finance effective fiscal 
policies. 
 “Underlying this poor fiscal performance were Argentina’s weak political institutions, 
which persistently pushed the political system to commit more fiscal resources than it was 
capable of mobilizing. Public expenditure could not be controlled because spending was often 
used as an instrument of political favor. Tax administration was also weak, leading to 
widespread tax avoidance and evasion, and efforts to improve tax compliance were not 
successful.”17 Dr. Eduardo Stordeur from Di Tella University points out that in the 1990s, the 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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Menem regime used government spending to force stability. Such cost was high, resulting in 
unsustainably high government debt.18  
 Many believe that the main mistake was the pegging of the peso to the dollar. Nobel 
Prize winning economist and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz is one of them: 
“This was ‘a system doomed to failure’, not because of mistakes made by the country, but 
because of shocks from beyond its borders that were caused by the volatility of international 
financial markets... Sticking to the peso-dollar peg resulted from a single-minded focus on 
inflation, without a concern for employment or growth”19 This is agreed by Guillermo Perry and 
Luis Servén: the peg to an appreciating dollar played a dominant role in the emergence of the 
Argentine crisis.20  
IMF explains how the convertibility regime hurt the country’s economy during the crisis: 
“By all but eliminating money creation as a source of revenue, it raised the required level of 
fiscal discipline. While this was extremely positive in terms of its impact on inflation, it also 
increased the potential long-term disruptive effect if the fiscal discipline was not fully delivered. 
It also made adjustment to adverse shocks more difficult by eliminating nominal depreciation 
as an instrument of policy. Had wages and prices been sufficiently flexible downward, the 
required real exchange rate depreciation could have been achieved through price deflation. In 
the absence of downward wage flexibility, the improvement in the current account required by 
                                                          
18 Presentation given by Dr. Eduardo Stordeur, Di Tella University (Mar. 21, 2016). 
19 Jan Joost Teunissen & Age Akkerman, The Crisis That Was Not Prevented: Argentina, the IMF, and Globalisation, 
FONDAD, Jan. 2003, at 3.  
20 Id. at 6. 
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the series of adverse shocks that hit Argentina from late 1998 could only be achieved through a 
prolonged demand contraction.”21 
 Even former Justice Rodolfo C. Barra agreed that the convertibility plan was a mistake 
for the last few years of President Menem’s term.22 Justice Barra served as a justice of the 
Supreme Court of Argentina between 1989 and 1993, and as Minister of Justice between 1993 
and 1996. He has been a firm supporter for President Menem’s economic policies, and was in 
charge of drafting laws for privatization in the 90’s.   
 Dr. Jose Gabriel Palma emphasizes financial liberalization’s role in generating 
vulnerability in Argentina’s economy, especially the full opening of the capital account                                              
to international financial markets. Argentina had opened up its capital accounts since President 
Menem came into power, and it “had done so at a time of high liquidity in international 
financial markets, and slow growth.”23 “Foreign capital swamped [Argentina] due to several 
‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors.”24 “Push” factors included excess liquidity in international financial 
markets, business cycle conditions, changes in interest rates, the rise of institutional investors 
always in need of new profitable assets, and demographic forces in industrial countries, while 
“pull” factors included the combination of radical economic reforms (in particular wholesale 
privatizations, and trade liberalization) and the opening up of the capital account in a context of 
undervalued asset markets, high interest rate spread, and expectations of stable exchange rate 
                                                          
21 Independent Evaluation Office, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
22 Interview with Justice Rodolfo C. Barra (Mar. 18, 2016). 
23 José Gabriel Palma, How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid financial markets led Latin 
America to two and a half cycles of ‘mania, panic and crash’, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics (Jan. 2012), 
http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1201.pdf. 
24 Id. 
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under the convertibility plan.25 Unfortunately, not only did the tsunami of inflows have little or 
no positive impact on the real economy, it increased volatility and the correlation of returns on 
financial assets, which were both proved when adverse external shocks hit Argentina in 1998.26 
Economic Situation Today 
 Argentina’s new president, Mauricio Macri, took office recently in December 2015. The 
economic situation that he faced was not promising. His administration inherited from the last 
regime: “[o]ne of the world’s highest inflation rates, near 30% poverty, an ‘historically high’ 
budget deficit of 7% of GDP, a slump in Central Bank reserves, and a long-running debt dispute 
with vulture funds.”27  
 Before President Macri, former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner and her late 
husband, Néstor Kirchner, who governed before her, had been in power since 2003. Their 
economic policies reflected “priority for financial independence, social equity, and what 
may be considered a commitment to ‘populist’ macroeconomic solutions.”28 To achieve these 
goals, many believe that the regime sabotaged the rule of law by micromanaging the market. 
Economy was distorted by their interventionist policies. 
                                                          
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Recap: The Key Points of President Macri’s Speech to Congress, The Argentina Independent, Mar. 2, 2016, 
http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/analysis/the-key-points-of-president-macris-speech-to-
congress/. 
28 J. F. Hornbeck, Argentina’s Post-Crisis Economic Reform: Challenges for U.S. Policy, Congressional Research 
Service, Apr. 15, 2013, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43022.pdf. 
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Inflation was high. It reached 38% in 2014, and dropped to 26.9% in 2015.29 “Given 
political intervention in the National Institute of Statistics, official reports are not credible; but 
all estimates suggest that before the recent devaluation, inflation exceeded 20% [in 2016].”30 
Economic stagnation was a serious problem. In 2015, before the elections brought 
economic hope, its economy was projected to show little or negative growth that year.31 
Argentina was still indebted to American hedge funds, making it unable to access foreign 
investment. The country could not develop its economy without necessary capital. For example, 
a massive oil field sat untouched because the country did not have the money to drill.32 
Argentina's economy relied heavily on commodities like oil and soybeans.33 Prices for those two 
have tanked in 2015, and the country's two key trade partners -- Russia and China -- have 
slowed down. What makes it worse is that the government also suffered from a 5.4 percent 
GDP budget deficit (the biggest since 1982).34    
The exchange rate of peso was also unstable. “Trade protection, managed exchange 
rates, and capital controls, for example, are policy adjustments required to address problems 
that materialize in a constrained economic system (e.g., subsidy-driven fiscal expansion, price 
controls, inability to borrow internationally) that cannot easily accommodate current account 
deficits, a market exchange rate, or standard macroeconomic responses to high inflation.”35 In 
                                                          
29 Argentina - Inflation (end of period), FocusEconomics, http://www.focus-economics.com/country-
indicator/argentina/inflation-eop (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
30 Joseph E. Stiglitz & Martin Guzman, What's on Argentina's balance sheet?, World Economic Forum, Feb. 5, 2016, 
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/what-s-on-argentina-s-balance-sheet/. 
31 Patrick Gillespie, Is Argentina's economy pulling a tango turnaround?, CNN, May 7, 2015, 
http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/07/investing/argentina-economy-stocks/. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Maria Candia, Can Mauricio Macri Save Argentina’s Economy?, Foreign Policy, Mar. 24, 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/24/can-mauricio-macri-save-argentinas-economy-obama-kirchner/. 
35 Hornbeck, supra note 28. 
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November 2011, the Kirchner regime introduced currency controls, named el cepo (or “the 
clamp”), which made it almost impossible for ordinary Argentines to purchase dollars, preferred 
by savers to the inflation-prone peso.36 It substantially overvalued peso. After President Macri 
freed the currency, it fell by more than 30%.37 
Macri’s Economic Policies 
 President Macri “has wasted little time in undoing the populist policies of his 
predecessor. On December 14th he scrapped export taxes on agricultural products such as 
wheat, beef and corn and reduced them on soyabeans, the biggest export. Two days later 
Alfonso Prat-Gay, the new finance minister, lifted currency controls, allowing the peso to float 
freely. A team from the new government then met the mediator in a dispute with foreign 
bondholders in an attempt to end Argentina’s isolation from the international credit 
markets.”38 
 “The economic reforms seem to be working. Farmers who had hoarded grain in the 
hope that the tariffs would be lifted are now selling, replenishing foreign-exchange reserves 
that had been drained to defend the artificially strong peso. The newly freed currency fell by 
more than 30%, a further boost to exporters. It has stabilised at around 13 pesos to the dollar. 
“Substantive” talks with holdout bondholders starting in early January could lead to a return to 
credit markets in 2016.”39  
                                                          
36 Argentina lifts controls on the peso, The Economist, Dec. 17, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21684487-floating-currency-government-has-moved-step-closer-
normalising-troubled 
37 Reuters, supra note 2. 
38 A fast start, The Economist, Jan. 2 2016, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21684823-mauricio-
macris-early-decisions-are-bringing-benefits-and-making-waves-fast-start. 
39 Id. 
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“But the devaluation has pushed up the inflation rate, already more than 25% when Mr 
Macri took office. To rein it back, on December 15th the central bank raised interest rates on 
short-term fixed deposits by eight percentage points to 38%. The government hopes to 
persuade business and trade-union leaders to keep tight control of prices and wages. But that 
may prove difficult: the unions are fragmented and little disposed to help Mr. Macri, a centre-
right politician; businesses may balk at holding down prices.”40 
How Likely to Repeat the 1990s? 
 The similarities between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015 worry many that 
Argentina might repeat the 1990s and have another crisis in the near future. Both periods saw 
high inflation, economic stagnation, fiscal deficit, depressed foreign trade and downward 
pressure on the value of the currency. What makes it more worrisome is that President Macri’s 
economic policies mimic many of the Washington Consensus is policies: he vows to restore 
fiscal discipline and bring down the budget deficit; he lifted currency controls to achieve a 
competitive exchange rate and boost foreign trade liberalization; and he has managed solve the 
debt issue to liberalize of inward foreign direct investment. At the same time, he vows to bring 
down inflation.  
There is one major difference between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015: the 
level of inflation. In 1989, inflation reached an unprecedented 5,000%. It led to riots and 
President Alfonsin’s early departure from the office. It was the most urgent problem to solve 
for the Menem regime. In 2015, Argentina’s inflation rate was 26.9%. It was still one of the 
world’s highest inflation rates, but it was incomparable to the number in 1989. This wins 
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President Macri time and flexibility to address the inflation issue. The new regime was able to 
choose drying up money supply with high interest rates to tackle high inflation, instead of 
taking extreme measures such as the convertibility plan, which was believed to be a main 
reason for the 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression. 
It is also worth noting President Menem and President Macri’s ideological differences. 
Professor Estela Sacristan, an expert in administrative law and regulation, points out that while 
President Menem was a far-right politician, President Macri is center-right.41 President Menem 
was a Peronist. “Peronism is a brand rather than a party. Its official vehicle is called the 
Justicialist Party. To the extent that it has an ideology it is a vague blend of nationalism and 
labourism, expressed in the PJ’s founding ‘three banners’ of political sovereignty, economic 
independence and social justice.”42 “In 1989 when he was elected president, people expected 
Menem to carry forward a populist plan with a nationalistic style. Within a few short months, 
however, he convinced many of his supporters of the need to take a sharp turn toward 
neoliberal, monetarist, anti-statist policies.”43  
President Macri is clearly against the Kirchner regime’s interventionist policies, but 
Professor Sacristan points out that “he is not a big fan of the market.”44 “The party he founded 
and leads, Republican Proposal (PRO), started out on the right but has become more inclusive. 
It is non-Peronist—the political current to which his presidential rival, Daniel Scioli, belongs—
                                                          
41 Presentation given by Estela Sacristan (Mar. 17, 2016). 
42 The persistence of Peronism, The Economist, Oct. 15, 2015, 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21674783-argentinas-dominant-political-brand-defined-power-not-
ideology-persistence. 
43 Beatriz Sarlo, Argentina Under Menem: The Aesthetics of Domination, nacla, https://nacla.org/article/argentina-
under-menem-aesthetics-domination (last visited Apr. 26, 2016). 
44 Sacristan, supra note 41.  
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but is not anti-Peronist; many ex-Peronists work alongside the party’s conservative founders.”45 
Therefore, although President Macri is introducing trade, currency and foreign investment 
liberalization as President Menem did, he is likely to maintain a necessary level of regulations. 
In this way, he can avoid the full opening of the capital account to international financial 
markets, which would make Argentina’s economy extremely vulnerable to external shocks. 
Conclusion 
 The similarities between the economic situations of 1989 and 2015 and the similarities 
between President Menem and President Macri’s economic policies concern many that 
Argentina might repeat the 1990s and have another crisis in the near future. But the truth may 
not be as worrisome as it seems. When looked closely, there is one major difference between 
the economic situations of 1989 and 2015: the inflation in 2015 was much lower than in 1989. It 
gave President Macri flexibility to tackle high inflation with high interest rates, instead of taking 
extreme measures such as the convertibility plan, which was believed to be a main reason for 
the 1998–2002 Argentine Great Depression. Furthermore, while President Menem was a far-
right politician, President Macri is center-right. The current regime is likely to maintain a 
necessary level of regulations, and avoid the full opening of the capital account to international 
financial markets, which was another reason for the Depression. 
  
                                                          
45 Macri-economics, The Economist, Oct. 29, 2015, http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21677250-profile-
possible-president-macri-economics. 
